Water Privatisation has suddenly come to mean big bucks in India. With water resources in the country fast depleting and the government throwing up its hands, at least five global Corporates are ready to tap the over $ 2,000 million market. They have already set up shops in several States and are confident of seeing their projects approved, with the central government literally rolling the red carpet to welcome them. (Shiva and Jalees 2003)
To facilitate “private partnerships,” the ministry of urban development in May 2003 released a set of guidelines to State governments for creating a “welcoming atmosphere” in the drinking water sector.
Neither the guidelines nor the National Water Policy, 2002, which advocates more private involvement in the water sector bother to see the result of such corporatization elsewhere in the world. As in Bolivia, where riots broke out in the city of Cochabamba after a 35 per cent increase in water bills, such experiment have been contentious almost everywhere. According to a study compiled by David Hall, director of the Public Services International Research Unit at the University of Greenwich, privatisation of water of the Philippines, Germany, Brazil, Nairobi and Argentina have led to a tremendous increase in water prices, triggering public outrage. Making profit on people’s most basic needs is the dream of many corporate executives. (Shiva and Jalees 2003)
Global players are keenly watching the developments in India and are slowly seeping into the sector. Degremont, a subsidiary of France’s Suez, has projects in six cities of India and has plans for further expansion. The company is dealing in treatment of water exclusively. Future expansion will depend on the kind of trade environment the government creates.
Degremont has a project in Delhi; the Sonia Vihar treatment plant is being developed by the company on a Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contract for a fixed period of seven to ten years during which its profits are guaranteed by the government.
While private companies like Degremont have the government subsidizing their profits, other international agencies are looking forward to the civic bodies reforming their tariff structure to pay back loans.
It perceives water not as a fundamental right of the people, but as a commodity the government can no longer afford to make available to its people free of cost or at subsidised price. This approach, according to Himanshu Thakkar of the South Asia Network on Dams, River and People (SANDRP), is fundamentally flawed. “Water is a natural resource and the government owns it only because it promises to make it available to people. On what basis has the government made water a commercial product? On what basis are the private companies selling bottled water to people? Who has allowed them to make profit out of this natural resource (Joshi, 2003)
i, 2003) The answer to shrinking water resources and growing needs, according to Thakkar, does not lie in privatisation but in community participation and transparency on the part of the distributing agencies. Conservation efforts in India have been pioneered not by the government but by the community leaders like Anna Hazare and Rajender Singh. The irony, says Thakkar, is that while the government claims that it does not have any money to make infrastructure improvements in the existing maintenance and distribution system, it is willing to subsidise profits for the foreign trade companies in the water sector.
It is like privatising national assets and nationalizing private losses. The country is being sold and nobody has the courage to speak out. Why would a multinational invest in water without expecting you to pay back several timed the amount?
Nevertheless, Indian policy-makers justify privatisation as a necessary step for reforms in the water sector. “Everyone looks at it as a natural resource for which nobody should be asked to pay. The problem is that the water, which reaches your house has to be first taken to the treatment plants, has to be treated and then piped to homes. All this costs money. Where is that going to come from?” says Planning Commission (Joshi, 2003).
Access to a fair share of clean, healthy water is a basic human right and indeed the basis of our existence. According to the World Health Organization, 60 per cent (3.6 billion) of the world’s population lacks access to essential sanitation facilities. It is estimated that in the next quarter of the century, the proportion of the world’s population living in countries with significant water-stress could rise from 34 per cent (1995 figures) to 63 per cent. This would mean that water related conflicts would increase, as communities try to fulfil their basic needs.
Although, less than ten per cent of the world’s water systems are currently under private control, at the present rate it is possible that the top three MNCs, i.e., Suez and Vivendi of France and RWE-AG of Germany, alone will control over seventy per cent of the water system in Europe and North America in a decade.
Vivendi that earned $ 5 billion a decade ago in its water related revenues had increased its profits to over $ 12 billion by 2002. RWE, which moved into the world market, with its acquisition of Britain’s Thames Water, increased its water revenue by a whopping 9,786 per cent in ten years. All three are among the top one hundred corporations in the world. Together, their annual revenue in 2001 was almost $ 160 billion, and is growing at ten per cent a year – outpacing the economies of many countries in which they operate. They also employ more staff than most of the government's (Barlow, 2003).
The state has a great duty vis-à-vis distribution of drinking water. Our rivers are sacred, so too our lakes and dams, which serve several social uses. Aqua robbery by corporates is becoming common. The core principle of the public law is that the state is a trustee of all natural resources and is under a legal duty to protect them. These are resources and are meant for public use and cannot be converted into private ownership (Iyer, 2003).
The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known as the “Doctrine of Public Trust.” The public trust doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, water and the forest have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to every one irrespective of the status of life. The doctrine enjoins upon the government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit the use for private ownership or commercial purpose.
The Ganga or Narmada belongs to the people and the state cannot abandon its fiduciary obligation. It is unconstitutional, unethical and violative of human rights to sell or negotiate disposal of publicly owned water resources for mineral water rackets by industrial giants. Equally dangerous, mischievous and mala fide are permissions granted to macro corporates to dig dam to the bowels of earth, pump up waters in enormous quantities and leave the lakes and neighbouring wells deprived of the blessing of nature.
Serious questions are raised when the public properties are given to the corporations. Public funds bear the burden of public accountability (Dhawan, 2003).
Water and international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and IMF have required developing countries to open up their water distribution to private sector investment and foreign companies as a condition of rescheduling debt. Bolivia, for example, had to accept comprehensive water privatisation as a condition of receiving new loans. And it doesn’t start or end with just drinking water. Large dams are mostly built with the support (or pressure) of IFIs like Asian Development Bank, affecting not only drinking water but also the livelihoods and homes of hundreds of thousands of people.
The IMF and the World Bank, along with other financial institutions, support a ‘full costrecovery’ principle. Financing criteria favour multi-utility service providers from many development providers, and this is also influencing the development of the water multinationals taking over other sectors.
As no one can survive without water, the multinational water companies have discovered a profitable market. The biggest multinational water companies come from Europe – Vivendi, Suez-Lyonnaise, Thames Water.
These companies have a record of corruption and bribery, pollution, and ignorance for the health and safety of both their employers and their customers. Extensive interlinks exist between executives from major water companies, the government and other sectors, mainly banking and international finance.
Vivendi is the world’s largest water service provider through its subsidiary, Generale des Eux, and operates in 90 countries. Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux has operations in 120 countries, supplying water to 72 million people. The water industry is expanding rapidly the range of their activities and the geographic reach of their services. (Shiva and Jalees 2003)
Reality:
The people of Nairobi, Kenya, for example, were forced to fork out over R (Rands) 160 million when Nairobi’s water was privatised to French multinational, Generales Des Eaux. Soon after the company, they decided to install a new (but not budgeted for) R 1.5 billion billing and revenue collection service. Although the Mayor complained, the company proceeded and put water prices up by 40 per cent in order to pay for the new system. During this time, 3,500 municipal workers were replaced by 45 foreign staff who earned massive salaries from a total R 13.6 million in the second year of the contract, rising to R 31.2 million per year by the end of the contract.
Privatisation of water was also found bad for the poor of Guinea. Before privatisation in 1989, fewer than 40 per cent of the urban population had access to piped water. The Government was short of funds and needed donor finance. Private participation was a condition of World Bank lending. The work force was cut almost in half form 504 employees to 290 and right after privatisation, water prices were increased. The connection rate rose only by 9 per cent by 7 years leaving over 30 per cent of Guineans still without water. The high price of water meant people could not afford to get connected; it was difficult for even wealthy people to pay.
Reality:
The most recent example is the World Bank’ role in creating the conditions that caused the current cholera epidemic in South Africa.
Reality:
The World Bank’s insistence on full cost recovery service cut-offs to those unable to pay forced a number of communities to access unclean water sources in South Africa recently.
The World Bank has funded some rural water schemes in Ghana. These have failed because the Bank demanded that rural communities pay upfront cash amount towards constructing the water system. “The policy has resulted in excluding poor communities incapable of paying from enjoying their right to consume potable water,” says the CAP-Ghana of Water.
Reality:
Biwater, which privatised Nelspruit’s water, withdrew from a Zimbabwean water privatisation project when it became clear that citizens could not pay the tariffs that would be required for Biwater to make a profit.
Reality:
The World Bank’s preference for massive projects led to the exceedingly and unnecessary expensive (and fatally corrupt) Lesotho Highlands dam project, which caused water price to jump, forcing even more communities to be a cut off. Twelve multinationals are being prosecuted for paying bribes in connection with huge water engineering contracts for the water supply scheme. [The trial began in Lesotho Government for what is expected to be a very complex and costly trial.]
In France, the home of ‘delegated management’ (the World Bank’s favourite form of privatisation), the major multinationals have been convicted of bribery. In Milan, in neighbouring Italy, police are investigating politicians’ alleged role to have received bribes from a private company for a concession to build a new sanitation plant.
In Indonesia (during the infamous Suharto’s regime), Jakarta’s water was privatised through a French and a British consortium: both were in partnership with companies owned by Suharto’s relatives and cronies.
Some of the World Bank Researchers note: “Our empirical research provides clear evidence of the importance of public procurement corruption, defined as efforts to secure public contracts through payment of kickbacks to officials, as an oft-used channel of influence as well.” “…the extent to which firms with foreign direct investment and transnationals are also involved in playing public procurement kickbacks and engaged in other forms of corruption.” …“Conventional recommendations of economic and trade liberalization advocated to address administrative corruption will not suffice.”
The two dominant water multinationals, Suez-Lyonnaise and Vivendi, are convicted in corruption cases.
Reality:
The World Bank’s preference for massive projects led to the exceedingly and unnecessary expensive (and fatally corrupt) Lesotho Highlands dam projects, which caused water prices to jump, forcing even more communities to be cut off.
Reality:
Water and Sanitation sectors by their very nature create monopolies in their respective service areas.
There are only four European multinationals that have the monopoly worldwide on water for profit. One of these, French Vivendi, has recently started raising water prices in the poorest countries of the world because they need extra cash to inject into a Hollywood studio they acquired recently.
Reality:
In Europe, water privatisation has been failing for decades, and in several towns water has been “re-municipalised” or taken back from whichever multinational messed up the service.
In Africa, recent research conducted by London-based Greenwich University’s Public Service International Research Unit uncovered that where water was privatised, it was as disastrous as the European experience.
Service Contracts –
Involves short-term contracts for provision of specific services. For example, metre reading and billing. No financial risks are involved, and also there is no direct legal relationship with the consumer.
Lease / Management Contract –
As the name suggests, either the private company leases out of the facility from the civil authority, or the latter appoints the company for managing the facility. In either case, the ownership remains public; private company is normally not responsible for new investments or expansion. Some commercial risk is involved in so far as day-to-day operations are concerned.
BOOT Contracts –
Build Own Operate Transfer Contract in which the private company builds some part of the infrastructure - say the treatment plant, or filtration plant – and runs it for a regular charge on the system. Normally, these would be long-term contract, with a purchase agreement that would guarantee a minimum demand (the equivalent of the “take-orpay” clause of Power Purchase Agreement (PPAs) in the power sector).
Concessions –
Long term contracts in which the private company takes full charge of the system, takes responsibility for the provision of the service and is also responsible for expansion, new investment, recover of bills, etc.
Divestures –
Where the Government divests its equity in a utility that is then bought off by a private company. This may be full or part divesture.
In most cases, the establishment of an independent regulator, whose functions normally include setting the tariffs, is a part and parcel of privatisation.
While the private sector participation in water supply is just beginning in India, it has been extensive in Latin America and Southeast Asia. What are the implications of the privatisation of water supply? To understand this, we need to look also at the experience of water privatisation in other countries.
Resource mobilization of the project:
Basically, TEA, TACID and IL & FS together are responsible to design and execute the project. Therefore, a public limited company called New Tiruppur Area Development Corporation (NTADCL) was formed in 1995 to see through the project. The NTADCL will contract out the construction and maintenance of the system to a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) consortium, which is the Mahindra Consortium (Mahindra & Mahindra, United International, North West Water, and Bechtel). USAID has provided long term (30 years) loan guarantees for US $ 25 million with IL & FS to help finance this project. Total estimated cost of the project is Rs.12 billion of which equity share of Rs.3.9 billion will be contributed by the Union Government, IL & FS, the Tamil Nadu Corporation for Industrial Infrastructure Development, the Tiruppur Exporters Association and the Mahindra-led consortium. The project has a debt component of Rs.6.98 billion and a subordinate debt of Rs.750 million.
The project is supposed to be in full operation within six years. It is boasted that this is the first public-private partnership project to access commercial funds for the water sector in India. The Tiruppur experiment is going to be the benchmark for private initiatives in the sector and it will build a strong case for private financing of water projects in India in the future.
Treatment of effluent generated by the industries is not taken care of by the company. One of the important processes in the making of knitwear products is dyeing and bleaching. This particular process not only consumes enormous quantity of water, but almost the same quantity of water is discharged as effluent. The major part of effluent is discharged into the Noyyal river and to a significant extent in other small streams such as Nallar and Jamunai rivers. The available evidence confirms that the effluents discharged by these units are quite hazardous causing serious health problems. This is evident from the type and extent of chemicals used in the bleaching and dyeing processes. The estimated water requirements of the bleaching and dyeing units in Tiruppur is about 120 million litres per day (mid) of which about 60 per cent is met by groundwater as transported by the tanker-trucks from the rural neighbourhood. What is really disturbing is the fact that a comparable quantity of water is let out as effluent in the Noyyal river and other streams, which has already caused permanent damage to the river, top soil and most important of all, the groundwater.
Even 30 years earlier, the local textile operators have confirmed that groundwater is contaminated around the areas where dyeing and bleaching units discharge their effluents. In the absence of any perennial source of surface water, the villages around Tiruppur entirely depend upon groundwater for agriculture. As groundwater is contaminated, agriculture as the key occupation seems to have been abandoned in many villages.
The Government of Tamil Nadu has constructed a dam across this river (called Orathapalayam dam) in the year 1992, about 10 kms below the Tiruppur town, with a view to provide irrigation for 8,000 hectares. This dam’s catchment area is 2,245 sq. kms, which includes most of the area in which the dyeing and bleaching units are located. The construction of this dam has turned out to be a mockery and has resulted in the wastage of public resources. This is simply because a large quantity of water (about 120 mld) consumed by the Tiruppur dyeing and bleaching units is conveniently led into the Noyyal river (in the form of untreated trade effluent), contributing thereby to the ‘additional storage level’ of the dam. Thus, the dam effectively performs the role of a storage reservoir for the contaminated water, contributing quite significantly to the pollution of environment, in particular, groundwater. Unless 20,000 cusecs of water is released into the river Cauvery, a major river into which Noyyal joins in the downstream. The release of water from the Orathapalayam dam would be extremely harmful to the crops, soil, animals and groundwater.
In February 1997 when there was no appreciable flow in the river Cauvery, the water from the Orathapalayam dam was released with a view to minimize the damage to the villages around the dam. Since the dam was opened without any prior public notice, it resulted in a great havoc to crops, animals, soil and groundwater. This polluted water of the Noyyal river joined Cauvery 32 kms down the Orathapalayam dam. It is reported that the water quality remains bad even at 300 feet depth, rendering it unfit even for irrigation.
If the new water company in Tiruppur brings additional water (185 million litres per day), the pollution threat is going to escalate further. The existing common effluent treatment plants (CETPs), a total of eight, hardly function but satisfy the Supreme Court order. Further, these CETPs are not designed to treat the TDS, which is the biggest pollutant. Since the treatment system is very expensive, no industry is willing to treat the effluent. Therefore, the new company will pose additional problem by bringing more water to the town.
The other problem related to Water Company is the fixing of the price of water for the domestic users. The rates are not decided so far but it goes without saying that the new rates for water is going to adversely affect the common man in the region. (Shiva and Jalees, 2003)
In brief privatisation of water will have devastating implications, some of them are listed below (Sharma and Naqvi 2004).
(i) Privatisation is an attack on the community rights over water.
(ii) Privatisation of water will result in the hike of water tariff.
(iii) Privatisation of water will reduce the availability of water.
(iv) Privatisation of water will affect the quality of water.
(v) Privatisation of water will result in the exploitation of consumers.
(vi) Privatisation of water will result in huge benefits to the Multinationals at the cost of survival of consumers.
(vii) Privatisation of water will lead to the corruption.
(viii) Privatisation of water will cause the retrenchment of the employees.
(xi) The water is privatized; it is difficult for the Government take control over the water again.
(x) Privatisation of water will result in number of diseases due to poor quality of water.
B. Recurring Cost
i. Upper Ganga Canal irrigates 924,000 hectares in 13 districts in western UP. As one hectare is 12.5 bighas, it irrigates 924,000 x 12.5 = 11,550,000 bighas. At an estimate the per bigha income per year = Rs.3,500 So the total agricultural income from Upper Ganga Canal = 11,550,000 x 3500 = 40,425,000,000 = 4,042.5 crores per year
ii. In the rural areas the farmers, particularly marginal, small and medium farmers also do cattle rearing which is closely linked with the agriculture development. In all 13 districts where the land is irrigated by Upper Ganga Canal, the earning from the cattle rearing is around 2,000 crores per annum.
iii. Besides, there are a large number of people like Blacksmiths, Carpenters and others, whose survival depends upon agricultural activities. There is also large number of landless labourers employed or hired by the farmers. It can be safely assumed that the total earning of these people is around 1,000 crores per annum. Total recurring cost, i.e., annual income from agriculture, cattle rearing, by artisans and landless labourers (i + ii + iii) =
i.e., 4,042.5 + 2,000 + 1,000 = 7,042.5 crores
For the guaranteed period of ten years the amount is Rs.7,042.5 crores x 10 =
= 70,425 crores
This is the basis of the full public cost recovery campaign by the people of India against the privatisation of Ganga by Suez. (Shiva and Jalees, 2003)
Shri S.D Sinha of Pani Morcha
suggested some conventional mean, which will have greater potential to conserve the water and therefore reduce the water crisis. We should maintain adequate flow in Yamuna, as river flow recharge the ground water. Delhi has the possibility of big reservoir, so we should build such reservoir near Najafgarh and Sainik Farm. Colony wise, rain water harvesting must be promoted. Small rain water harvesting may be done at home.
Smt Amarjeet Kaur, a well known trade union leader talked about the negligency of the government official, they do not work till the court intervene. Bureaucrats sit in the air condition room and never care for the poor like us. They are totally indifferent to our problems. Even the water from the Sonia Vihar will be supplied to the residents in posh colony who can afford Bisleri.
To pressurize the government officials we should involve Trade Union & leaders of the area they are first to interact with people.
Mr S.A Naqvi of DJB
highlighted the ever increasing level of pollution in Yamuna. When Yamuna enters Delhi, the water of Yamuna is reported of ‘B’ grade however when it leaves Delhi after traveling a strech of 48 km the quality of water deteriorates to “E” grade Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) is responsible. for 85% of water pollution to Yamuna. Besides three power plants in Delhi, Badarpur, Indraprastha and Rajghat discharge about an estimated 302 tonnes of fly as a everyday, which contaminate the ground as well as surface water due to bleaching of heavy metals present in the ash.
Mr S.A Naqvi of DJB discussed about the potential for using ‘grey water’. Water from clothes washers, bath tubs, shower or bathroom sink may be called grey water. As much as 235 MGD of water can be saved in Delhi, if all the residents start using recycled ‘grey water’ for non drinking purpose. Grey water is the most effective as supplemental irrigation source, and car washing.
“By using grey water, we reduce the need to pump ground water and reuse it as a resource and protect putable water for future. Grey water can also save money on water bill. A family of five generates about 70 gallon of grey water per day. That is a lot of water going down the drain that has already paid for and that can be reused” said Mr Naqvi.
Shri Sanjay Sharma of DJB discussed in detail about the financial sustainability of DJB through Public Public Partnerships. The only problem is the loan liablities of about Rs 4000 crores, which infact is the legacy of parent organization Delhi Water Supply & Sewerage Board. The initial amount was only Rs 1200 crores, which over the time has increased. It is an usual practice that whenever the government creates a new Department/Board/Organization, the loan liabilities are waived off.
According to Mr. Sanjay Sharma Delhi Jal Board was constituted by Delhi Jal Board Act 1998 (Delhi Act no 4 of 1998) to discharge the functions of water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal and drainage within the National Capital Territory region of Delhi Accordingly it is responsible for Supply of Water, sewage disposal and collection of revenue for the services provided within the jurisdiction of MCD area and also supply water in Bulk to the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB) and respective agencies further distribute water in their corresponding areas. Similarly, Sewage generated from NDMC and DCB areas is collected by respective agency and taken up by DJB for its disposal.
Presently there are about 1.5 million water connections and around 2996 MLD (Million Liters per day) of water produced at its six water treatment plants is distributed among the 1.5 million consumers. Delhi Jal Board DJB collects and treats 2337 MLD of sewage at its 17- wastewater treatment plants.
DJB was able to recover only 249.77 crore revenue from its all sources in 2003-04. The scenario of revenue collection always remains more or less same. The main recovery of revenue comes from water charges that contributes 98% of the total recovery rest 2% comes from other sources like bio gas charges and bio fertilizer. During the year 2003-2004, when DJB recover its highest ever revenue 249.77 crores, only 35 lacs contributed from bio gas charges.
Delhi Jal board has following type of consumers:
1. New Delhi Municipal Council and Delhi Cantonment board
2. Bulk consumers
3. Domestic consumers categories
4. Commercial consumers categories
5. Industrial consumers categories
There are total number of around 14.98 million water consumers in Delhi utilizing DJB’s water and allied services. Out of it 93% percent of consumers are domestic, 6% are commercial and only 1% are industrial consumers.
In terms of consumption of water, 93% domestic consumers consume 86% of water, commercial consumers those are just 6% consume 10% of water and 1% industrial consume 4% of water i.e 660 MGD or 2996 MLD.
Delhi Jal Board is in debt trap, the organization which total revenue recovery has yet to cross Rs 250 crores and spent 370 crore per year to provide water and sanitation services to the citizens will one day will certainly sink if the situation is not addressed and taken care of. Its accumulated debt will cross Rs. 4000 crore in next few months.
There are some options available to the problem in which Government has to play a role.
Option A:
Government may waive off the loan on Delhi Jal Board in one stretch as a social liability of it.
Option B:
Government may waive off the loan on Delhi Jal Board in one stretch with the condition that Jal Board has to raise it’s own financial resources in future and will not opt for loans. An assistant package may be considered for DJB.
Option C:
Government may waive off interest on Delhi Jal Board and take liability of interest on it. And may consider yearly financial assistant package for DJB as a social liability of it.
Option D:
If Government decline to take responsibility of fiscal deficit, than public funding may be answer.
According to Mr. Sanjay Sharma, the steps need to be taken with Public-Public Partnership are the following: -
❖ Reducing leakage or non-revenue water.
❖ DJB’s Bottled Water, ‘Jal’.
❖ Utilization of sewage by products.
❖ Installation of Water connection by DJB (presently license plumbers do the work).
❖ Horticulture work (DJB has large vacant land)
❖ Water consultancy to other organization.
❖ Deputing DJB staff on Tubewells/ Waterwells (Presently run by contractors)
❖ Saving from optium dose of Alum, Poly Aluminium Chloride and Chlorine.
❖ Water assurence Programme.
❖ Recycling of Water.
❖ Saving on Energy.
❖ Internal reforms.
The reform is not daytime schedule. It takes time to achieve the targets and studies are required to check the results. The above scheme and alternative for the financial sustainability is summarized as: -
1. Development charges from uregulairsed/ unauthorized water connection = Rs 2131 Crore (in phase manner)
2. Increasing revenue = Rs 499 Crore.
3. Alternate source of income = 75 Crore.
4. Internal Financial reforms = 47 Crore.
Total: 621 Crore extras + 2131 crore (onetime)
“The suggestion are based mainly on the experience gained from
Public Public Partnership
of ground one globe” concluded Mr Sharma”.
Thus according to Mr Sanjay Sharma through
Public Public Partnership
DJB cannot only sustain but it can also earn the profits of Rs 621 crores per year without any staff retrenchment, no water privatization and no need to enhance the tariff.
Shri Radhey Shayam Sharma, General Secretary of Yamuna Vihar Resident Welfare Association made some suggestion to improve the water availability in Delhi. According to Mr Radhey Shayam Sharma. We should not divert drinking water for irrigation. We should immediately inform about the leakage of water to DJB. We must conserve water by using it prudently. Inter linking of rivers will need astronomical amount of money and very long gestation period, however reservoir can be made with little amount and in very less time.
Mr Radhey Shayam Sharma added, “We should also not create panic. In the public by creating an alarm. There is a need to think positively to avert the crisis”.
In November 2004, the government of Delhi announced a steep tariff increase. It put out aggressive advertisement campaign on the need for citizens to pay more for water.
On 22nd November, women activists had a major protest against waater privatization and increase in water tariff. Women are committed to keeping control over water in women’s hands.